|
Written by Administrator
|
|
Monday, 21 May 2007 |
|
The seminar will be held at 02.00 p.m. (Room: ALBERTI 2)
Chair: Elettra Agliardi (Bologna University and Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, Italy)
Piero Gottardi (Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia and Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis) and Antonio Cabrales (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies
Abstract: We consider a model where a commodity of uncertain quality is traded in the market, information over it can be acquired at a cost and unverifiable reports over such information can be sold in the market. We characterize the equilibria and welfare properties for a variety of setups. We consider both the case where homogenous and differentiated reports are sold and where the seller of information may be interested in buying or selling he good or is a disinterested third party. The results show that disinterested third parties (firewalls) may lead to inefficiencies and monopolies may achieve the efficient outcome.
The seminar will be preceded by a lunch buffet at 01,00 p.m. (Room: AULA 2)
Location of the Rooms:
Room ALBERTI 1: Faculty of Economics, Via Q. Sella 13, Rimini
Room AULA 2: Faculty of Economics, Via Angherà 22, Rimini
|
|
Last Updated ( Monday, 18 June 2007 )
|
© Copyright